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Abstract
The relationship between uncertainty and managerial ﬂexibility is particularly crucial in ad-
dressing capital projects. We consider a ﬁrm that can invest in a project in either a single
(lumpy investment) or multiple stages (stepwise investment) under price uncertainty and has
discretion over not only the time of investment but also the size of the project. We conﬁrm
that, if the capacity of a project is ﬁxed, then lumpy investment becomes more valuable than a
stepwise investment strategy under high price uncertainty. By contrast, if a ﬁrm has discretion
over capacity, then we show that the stepwise investment strategy always dominates that of
lumpy investment. In addition, we show that the total amount of installed capacity under a
stepwise investment strategy is always greater than that under lumpy investment.
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1 Introduction
In irreversible investment, ﬁrms tend to split the projects in distinct phases. We explain this
behavior in a setup where there is uncertainty, discretion over timing, and over the choice of project
scale. According to standard economic literature (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; and Henry, 1974),
investment decisions are inﬂuenced by three main factors, namely, uncertainty, irreversibility, and
ﬂexibility. The ﬁrst refers to the uncertainty in the cash–ﬂows that a project generates, the second
to the inability to recover the investment cost after investment has taken place, and the third to the
discretion over the timing of investment. The latter allows for uncertainty in underlying parameters
to resolve before making an irreversible investment decision. Consequently, the ability to optimise
the investment timing raises the expected value of the investment opportunity, which, in, turn,
implies that investment is delayed relative to the traditional net present value (NPV) approach
due to the opportunity cost of killing the timing option. In fact, this hesitation is prolonged as
uncertainty increases, since the value of waiting increases. Interestingly, however, this result does
not extend analogously to other types of ﬂexibilities, and, in spite of the extensive literature that
challenges the traditional views of how uncertainty and irreversibility explain investment behaviour
(Alvarez and Stenbacka, 2004; Abel and Eberly, 1996), the interaction between uncertainty and
diﬀerent types of ﬂexibilities has not been thoroughly examined yet. By developing an analytical
framework for investment under uncertainty, we explore how discretion over project scale impacts
a ﬁrms incentive to invest in stages.
Indeed, one crucial type of managerial discretion is the ﬂexibility to either invest in an entire
project at a single point in time (lumpy investment) or divide it into smaller, modular projects and
then invest in each one at distinct points in time (stepwise investment). Empirical evidence indicates
that modularity can have crucial implications for the value of a project. For example, Baldwin and
Clark (2002) illustrate how the market value of the computer industry increased from the 1980s
until the 1990s as a result of its transition from a highly concentrated market, in which IBM played
a dominant role, to a large modular cluster of ﬁrms. By contrast, at the ﬁrm level and within
the context of sequential capacity expansion, Kort et al. (2010) show how uncertainty reduces the
value of modularity. More speciﬁcally, they show that, if the modularisation of a project is costly
and the size of each module is ﬁxed, then, high price uncertainty lowers the value of modularity in
favour of lumpy investment. This happens because high levels of uncertainty lower the incentive
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to make costly switches between stages, and, as a result, lumpy investment dominates the stepwise
investment strategy. A limitation of this work is that it studies a particular type of ﬂexibility in
isolation, when, in reality, ﬁrms can typically combine diﬀerent types of managerial ﬂexibilities.
Consequently, how various types of managerial discretion, e.g., discretion over capacity, option to
abandon, etc., interact to aﬀect the value of modularity under increasing uncertainty remains an
open question.
We address this disconnect by analysing how the ﬂexibility to choose between a lumpy and a
stepwise investment strategy interacts with discretion over capacity under price uncertainty. This
situation is relevant to various industries, e.g., renewable energy (RE) power plants. Indeed, in
the case of both on– and oﬀ–shore wind farms an area can, and often is, developed in stages.
Additionally, for capital intensive projects, discretion over capacity is particularly crucial, since the
installation of a large project increases a ﬁrm’s exposure to downside risk in the case of a potential
downturn, whereas the installation of a small project limits a ﬁrm’s upside potential if market
conditions suddenly become favourable. Thus, we contribute to the existing literature by developing
an analytical framework in order to explore how discretion over capacity interacts with the ﬂexibility
to choose between lumpy and stepwise investment under price uncertainty. Additionally, we derive
analytical results regarding the impact of uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold, the
optimal capacity, and the choice of investment strategy.
We proceed in Section 2 by discussing some related literature and introduce assumptions and
notation in Section 3. In Section 4, we formulate the problem and derive analytical expressions for
the value of the option to invest, the optimal investment threshold, and the corresponding optimal
capacity under lumpy and stepwise investment. In addition, we present analytical results regarding
the impact of uncertainty on the choice of investment strategy. We present numerical results in
Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The seminal work of Majd and Pindyck (1987) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) has spawned a sub-
stantial literature in the area of sequential investment. The former show how traditional valuation
methods understate the value of a project by ignoring the ﬂexibility embedded in the time to build,
while the latter develop a sequential investment framework with inﬁnite investment options assum-
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ing that the project value depreciates exponentially. The value of modularity is emphsasised in
Gollier et al. (2005), who allow for electricity price uncertainty and compare a sequence of small
nuclear power plants with a single nuclear power plant of large capacity. Intriguingly, their results
indicate that the option value of modularity may trigger investment in the initial module at a
level below the now–or–never NPV. In the same line of work, Malchow–Møller and Thorsen (2005)
illustrate how the investment policy resembles the simple NPV rule when investing sequentially in
subsequent upgrades of a technology. They ﬁnd that the expected value of subsequent upgrades
reduces the value of waiting to invest in the current version signiﬁcantly, while the investment rule
is less sensitive to changes in uncertainty. The advantages of modularity have also been stressed
within the context of investment in distributed generation capacity. For example, Siddiqui and
Maribu (2009) analyse how sequential investment may reduce the exposure of a microgrid to nat-
ural gas price volatility, and ﬁnd that a direct (sequential) investment strategy is more preferable
for low (high) levels of volatility. By contrast, Kort et al. (2010) show that, if stepwise investment
is more costly than lumpy investment, then high price uncertainty promotes the latter strategy
by reducing the incentive to make costly switches between stages. Siddiqui and Takashima (2013)
combine strategic interactions with sequential capacity expansion in order to explore how sequential
decision making oﬀsets the eﬀect of competition. They ﬁnd that the loss in the value of a ﬁrm due
to competition is reduced when the ﬁrm invests in stages and specify the conditions under which
sequential capacity expansion is more valuable for a duopolist ﬁrm than for a monopolist.
From a more empirical standpoint, Rodrigues and Armada (2007) present a real options ap-
proach to the valuation of modular projects, and show that modularisation can increase the value
of a project depending on the relative values, costs, and risk of each modular conﬁguration. Gamba
and Fusari (2009) develop a valuation approach based on real options theory in order to address
the issues that a modularisation process poses in terms of ﬁnancial valuation for capital budget-
ing. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁrst create a stochastic optimal control framework for the six modular
operators proposed by Baldwin and Clark (2000), and then adopt the least–squares Monte Carlo
method of Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (2001) in order to cope with the dynamic programming feature
of the valuation problems. While the aforementioned literature oﬀers a thorough analytical and
empirical treatment of the value of modularity and of sequential investment under uncertainty,
it ignores the potential implications from allowing for other types of managerial discretion that
ﬁrms typically take into account when designing an optimal investment policy, e.g., discretion over
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capacity, suspension and resumption options, etc.
Indeed, apart from discretion over the investment strategy, e.g., lumpy versus stepwise, ﬁrms
typically also have discretion over the size of a project, in the form of installed capacity. Dangl
(1999) addresses the problem of a ﬁrm that invests in a project with continuously scalable capacity
under demand uncertainty, and shows that, even when demand is high, low uncertainty makes
waiting for further information the optimal strategy. A similar approach is adopted by Bøckman
et al. (2008) for valuing small hydropower projects under electricity price uncertainty, however,
unlike to Dangl (1999), they assume a cost function that is convex in capacity, and, therefore, their
model is more pertinent to the energy sector. Huisman and Kort (2009) introduce game–theoretic
considerations and show how, in a duopolistic competition, a leader can use discretion over capacity
strategically in order to deter a follower’s entry temporarily. A policy–oriented model for investment
and capacity sizing is presented by Boomsma et al. (2012), who analyse the impact of uncertainty
stemming from diﬀerent types of policy mechanisms on investment and capacity sizing decisions.
The impact of risk aversion on such decisions when a ﬁrm has operational ﬂexibility is addressed in
Chronopoulos et al. (2012), who ﬁnd that higher risk aversion facilitates investment by decreasing
the optimal capacity of a project.
In the area of discrete capacity sizing, Dixit (1993) analyses the choice among mutually ex-
clusive projects of various capacities under uncertainty. The proposed decision rule requires that
the projects are ﬁrst ranked by capacity and then analysed separately in order to determine the
corresponding investment thresholds. The optimal project is the largest one for which the optimal
threshold is greater than the current price. A limitation in the approach of Dixit (1993) is identiﬁed
by De´camps et al. (2006), who determine an intermediate waiting region around the indiﬀerence
point between the NPVs of two projects. Consequently, it may be better to select the smaller
project should the price drop suﬃciently rather than wait for the price to hit the upper threshold
in order to select the larger project. Additionally, they allow for the option to switch to a larger
capacity after having made an initial investment in the smaller project. Fleten et al. (2007) adopt
the framework of De´camps et al. (2006) in order to model investment in wind turbines taking the
perspective of an investor who must choose among discrete alternatives and has discretion over
both the time of investment and the size of the project.
Apart from analysing the value of discretion over capacity in isolation, a strand of literature
combines it with various types of operational ﬂexibilities. For example, He and Pindyck (1992)
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allow for demand uncertainty and examine the technology and capacity choice problem of a ﬁrm
that can install either output–speciﬁc or ﬂexible capital, which may be used to produce diﬀerent
outputs. They formulate the capacity choice problem as a stochastic control problem, and show
that the value of the ﬁrm equals the value of its installed capital plus the expected value of its
options to add capacity in the future. Hagspiel et al. (2014) allow for production ﬂexibility and
compare a ﬂexible scenario, in which a ﬁrm can adjust production over time with the capacity level
as the upper bound, to the inﬂexible scenario, in which a ﬁrm ﬁxes production at capacity level from
the moment of investment onward. Among other results, they ﬁnd that the ﬂexible ﬁrm invests in
higher capacity than the inﬂexible ﬁrm and that the capacity diﬀerence increases with uncertainty.
Considering the choice between two types of technologies, Takashima et al. (2012) ﬁnd that price
uncertainty induces investors to maximise expected proﬁts by building larger plants, while the
consideration of mutually exclusive projects increases the option value of the entire investment
opportunity.
We extend the existing literature by developing and analytical framework that combines two
important types of managerial discretion, i.e., the ﬂexibility to invest in either a single or multiple
stages with discretion over capacity. Although increasing uncertainty favours a lumpy over a more
ﬂexible, yet more costly, stepwise investment strategy when the capacity of a project is ﬁxed,
the implications from allowing for discretion over capacity are not thoroughly examined yet. For
this reason, we assume that the capacity of the project is continuously scalable, and, in line with
Dangl (1999), the ﬁrm has the option to ﬁx the capacity of the project at investment. We ﬁrst
conﬁrm the results of Kort et al. (2010) and then show that, although the relative value of the two
strategies decreases with greater uncertainty, the stepwise investment strategy always dominates
that of lumpy investment. This seemingly counter–intuitive result happens because the ﬁrm can
optimise the size of the project in response to an increase in the cost of the stepwise investment
strategy relative to that of lumpy investment. Intuitively, the extra ﬂexibility to optimise the size of
the project mitigates the loss in project value due to the higher cost associated with the ﬂexibility
to proceed in stages, thereby oﬀsetting the beneﬁt of a lower investment cost via lumpy investment.
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3 Assumptions and Notation
We consider a price–taking ﬁrm that holds an option to invest in a project of inﬁnite lifetime
that may be completed in either a single or a sequence of i discrete stages with i ∈ N. Also, the
ﬁrm can either exercise an investment option immediately or delay investment in the light of price
uncertainty. We assume that there is no variable production cost and that the output price at time
t, Pt, where t ≥ 0 is continuous and denotes time, follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
that is described in (1)
dPt = μPtdt+ σPtdZt, P0 ≡ P > 0 (1)
where μ is the annual growth rate, σ is the annual volatility, and dZt is the increment of the
standard Brownian motion. Also, ρ > μ is the subjective discount rate. The capacity of the project
is denoted by Kj when the ﬁrm has discretion over investment timing and by Kj when the ﬁrm
exercises a now–or–never investment opportunity. Additionally, F j(·) is the expected value of the
now–or–never investment opportunity, where j ∈ {, si} (denoting lumpy and staged investment
respectively), while kj is the corresponding optimal capacity. For example, F (·) denotes the
expected value of the now–or–never investment opportunity under lumpy investment and k

is the
corresponding optimal capacity. If the option to defer investment is available, then Fj (·) denotes the
maximised option value, while τj , pj , and kj denote the time of investment, the optimal investment
threshold, and the corresponding optimal capacity, respectively. Note that we use upper–case letters
to denote state variables for capacity and output price and lower–case letter for the corresponding
optimal thresholds. The investment cost, I
(
Kj
)
, is indicated in (2)
I
(
Kj
)
= ajKj + bjK
γ
j
j , aj , bj , and γj > 1 (2)
where γj > 1 implies that this model is more suitable for describing projects that exhibit disec-
onomies of scale. In the energy sector, this is the case with RE power plants, while more general
examples where the use of a convex cost function can be realistic include a monopsonistic environ-
ment in which a ﬁrm contemplates investment facing increasing prices due to increasing demand.
As it becomes clear in Section 4, the assumption γj > 1 should be considered as an implication
of the model itself, and, therefore, is not restricting the analytical results. In fact, as we discuss
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in Section 4, the results of the paper are more general as they are expected to hold also under
economies of scale, i.e., γj < 1. For the purpose of comparing a lumpy investment to a strategy
that entails a series of modular investments, we assume that each individual stage of the stepwise
investment strategy is less costly than the entire project. However, in line with Kort et al. (2010),
we assume that the ﬂexibility to proceed in stages is costly, and, therefore, requires the ﬁrm to
incur a premium. Consequently, the total investment cost under a stepwise investment strategy is
greater than that under lumpy investment, as indicated in (3).
I
(
Ksi
)
< I (K

) ,∀i ∈ N and
∑
i
I
(
Ksi
)
> I (K

) (3)
Notice that, although a ﬁrm may have the ﬂexibility to respond to low prices by producing at a
level below the installed capacity, in this paper, we assume that a ﬁrm does not have production
ﬂexibility. This is often referred to as the clearance assumption and is widely used in the literature
(Chod and Rudi, 2005; Anand and Girotra, 2007). For example, in the energy sector this assump-
tion is relevant to baseload and RE power plants. Additionally, ﬁxed costs, e.g., commitments to
suppliers and production ramp–up, make it too costly to produce below the capacity level (Goyal
and Netessine, 2007). In the car industry, ﬁrms often prefer to reduce prices in order to maintain
production at full capacity, instead of producing below capacity (Mackintosh, 2003).
4 Model
The ﬁrm’s optimisation objective under each investment strategy, i.e., lumpy and stepwise invest-
ment, is summarised in (4). The outer maximisation corresponds to the general decision on whether
to invest immediately or delay investment. If the ﬁrm decides to wait for an inﬁnitesimal time in-
terval dt, then, according to the Bellman principle, the value that the ﬁrm holds is the discounted
expected value of the capital appreciation of the option to invest. This is represented by the ﬁrst
argument of the maximisation on the right–hand side of (4). By contrast, the second argument of
the outer maximisation represents the value that the ﬁrm receives if it decides to exercise a now–
or–never investment opportunity. More speciﬁcally, the inner maximisation indicates that when
the ﬁrm decides to invest it will chose the capacity of the project in such a way that maximises its
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expected NPV.
Fj (P ) = max
{
(1− ρdt)EP
[
Fj (P + dP )
]
,max
K
j
[
F j
(
P,Kj
)]}
, j = , si and i = 1, 2 (4)
We begin by assuming that the ﬁrm adopts a lumpy investment strategy. In this case, the ﬁrm
can delay investment until τ

, at which point it must ﬁx the capacity of the entire project, K

, as
shown in Figure 1. Consequently, K

is a function of the output price, P

, at time τ

.
P

,K

ﬀ
∫ ∞
τ

e−ρtPtKdt− I (K) · · ·

τ

0
•
t
Figure 1: Lumpy investment
Initially, we assume that the ﬁrm ignores the option to wait for more information and invests in the
project immediately. Hence, we ﬁrst address the inner maximisation in (4). The expected value of
the now–or–never investment opportunity is indicated in (5).
F

(
P,K

)
=
PK

ρ− μ − I
(
K

)
(5)
Consequently, at investment, the output price, P , is known, and, therefore, the ﬁrm needs to
determine only the corresponding optimal capacity, k

, by maximising the value of the now–or–
never investment opportunity, as indicated in (6).
max
K

F

(
P,K

) ⇒ k

(P ) =
[
1
b

γ

(
P
ρ− μ − a
)] 1
γ

−1
(6)
We proceed by considering the outer maximisation in (4). If the ﬁrm can defer investment, then
the value of the option to invest is described in (7), where S denotes the set of stopping times of the
ﬁltration generated by the price process and EP is the expectation operator, which is conditional
on the initial value, P , of the price process.
F

(P ) = sup
τ

∈S
EP
[∫ ∞
τ

e−ρtPtKdt− I (K)
]
(7)
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Using the law of iterated expectations and the strong Markov property of the GBM, which states
that price values after time τ

are independent of the values before τ

and depend only on the value
of the process at τ

, we can rewrite (7) as in (8). The stochastic discount factor EP
[
e−ρτ
]
=
(
P
P

)β1
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.315), where and β1 > 1, β2 < 0 are the roots of
1
2σ
2β(β−1)+μβ−ρ = 0.
F

(P ) = sup
τ

∈S
EP
[
e−ρτ
]
EP

[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtPtKdt− I (K)
]
= max
P

≥P
(
P
P

)β1 [
P

K

ρ− μ − I (K)
]
(8)
Solving the unconstrained maximisation problem (8), we can express the maximised option value,
F

(P ), as in (9). The endogenous constant, A

, the optimal investment threshold, p

, and the
corresponding optimal capacity, k

, are determined via value–matching and smooth–pasting con-
ditions between the two branches of (9) together with the condition for optimal capacity choice at
investment (6) and are indicated in (A–7), (A–8), and (A–9), respectively for j =  (all proofs can
be found in the appendix).
F

(P ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
A

P β1 , for P < p

Pk

ρ−μ − I (k) , for P ≥ p
(9)
Next, we assume that the ﬁrm adopts a stepwise investment strategy, and, without loss of
generality, we assume that a stepwise investment comprises of two stages, i.e., i ≤ 2. As indicated
in Figure 2, the ﬁrm has the option to delay investment in the ﬁrst stage until τs1 , at which point
it must ﬁx the corresponding capacity, Ks1 . The ﬁrm receives the revenues of the ﬁrst stage until
τs2
, at which point it ﬁxes the capacity of the second stage, Ks2 . After the ﬁrm invests in the
second stage, it incurs the corresponding cost and receives the revenues from both stages.
Ps2
,Ks2
Ps1
,Ks1
ﬀ · · ·ﬀ 
∫ τs2
τs1
e−ρtPtKs1 dt− I
(
Ks1
) ∫ ∞
τs2
e−ρtPt
2∑
i=1
Ksi
dt− I
(
Ks2
)

τs1
0
•
τs2
•
t
Figure 2: Stepwise investment
The optimal capacity at each stage of the project when the ﬁrm invests immediately is obtained by
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maximising the value of the now–or–never investment opportunity. Following the same approach
as in the case of lumpy investment, the optimal capacity for each stage is indicated in (10). Notice
that the value of the now–or–never investment opportunity is the sum of the maximised NPVs from
each stage, i.e., F s(P ) =
∑
i F si
(
P, ksi
)
.
max
Ksi
F si
(
P,Ksi
)
⇒ ksi (P ) =
[
1
bsi
γsi
(
P
ρ− μ − asi
)] 1γsi −1
(10)
If the option to delay investment is available, then the optimisation objective is described in (11).
Notice that by completing the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm receives the option to proceed to the second. As
a result, the option to invest in the ﬁrst stage may be seen as a compound option.
Fs(P ) = sup
τs1
∈S
EP
[
sup
τs2
≥τs1
EP
[∫ τs2
τs1
e−ρtPtKs1 dt− I
(
Ks1
)
+
∫ ∞
τs2
e−ρtPt
2∑
i=1
Ksi
dt− I
(
Ks2
)]]
(11)
By decomposing the ﬁrst integral on the right–hand side of (11), we can express the original problem
as two separate optimal stopping–time problems, as in (12)
Fs(P ) = sup
τs1
∈S
EP
[∫ ∞
τs1
e−ρtPtKs1 dt− I
(
Ks1
)]
+ sup
τs2
≥τs1
EP
[∫ ∞
τs2
e−ρtPtKs2 dt− I
(
Ks2
)]
(12)
and the solution of each of the two optimal stopping–time problems is expressed in (13), where Asi
,
psi
, and ksi
are indicated in (A–7), (A–8), and (A–9), respectively. Notice that the value of the
option to invest is the sum of the respective option values of each stage, i.e., Fs(P ) =
∑
i Fsi
(P ).
Fsi
(P ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Asi
P
β1 , for P < psi
Pks
i
ρ−μ − I
(
ksi
)
, for P ≥ psi
(13)
Proposition 4.1 The optimal investment threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity under
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lumpy and stepwise investment are:
pj
(
kj
)
=
I
(
kj
)
kj
β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1 and kj =
[
aj
bj
1
γj(β1 − 1)− β1
] 1
γ
j
−1
, γj(β1 − 1)− β1 > 0 (14)
Assuming that τs2
≥ τs1 , Proposition 4.2 indicates that the decision to invest in the ﬁrst
stage is independent of the presence of the second. Intuitively, this result is a consequence of the
optimality of myopic behavior based on which a ﬁrm disregards subsequent investment decisions
when evaluating the current one. Within the context of capacity expansion, this property implies
that an investment in new capacity is evaluated assuming that it is the last one in the horizon.
The optimality of myopic behavior is not generally true but holds under certain assumptions. For
example, Bertola (1989) and Pindyck (1988, 1993) show that it holds in case of a monopoly as
considered in this paper. 1
Proposition 4.2 ps1 is independent of ps2 .
In line with the standard real options intuition, Proposition 4.3 indicates that greater uncertainty
raises both the optimal capacity of the project and the optimal investment threshold. This happens
because greater uncertainty increases the opportunity cost of an irreversible investment decision,
thereby raising the value of waiting. Furthermore, from (6) we know that the optimal capacity of
the project is a monotonic function of the output price. Consequently, an increase in the optimal
investment threshold results in the installation of a bigger project.
Proposition 4.3
∂kj
∂σ > 0 and
∂pj
∂σ > 0.
Interestingly, as Proposition 4.4 indicates, if the ﬁrm has discretion over capacity, then the
value of the option to proceed in stages is always greater than that under lumpy investment. This
is in contrast to Kort et al. (2010) who show that, under relatively large uncertainty, the single
stage investment is more attractive relative to a more ﬂexible, yet more costly, stepwise investment
strategy. This seemingly counter–intuitive result is based on the endogenous relationship between
the price at investment and the capacity of the project. Notice that, if a ﬁrm has discretion over
capacity, then, according to (14), the optimal capacity, kj is non–negative if γj(β1 − 1) − β1 > 0.
However, while greater uncertainty lowers the relative value of the two strategies, it also decreases
1Optimality of myopia also holds within a context of strategic interactions provided that the profit is additively
separable if more that one technology is considered (Baldurson and Karatzas, 1997).
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β1 . According to Proposition 4.4, the relative value of the two strategies does not decrease below one
for non–negative values of kj . Intuitively, although the value of the stepwise investment strategy
is reduced due to the cost that a ﬁrm incurs for the ﬂexibility to proceed in stages, the extra
ﬂexibility to scale the capacity of the project allows the ﬁrm to oﬀset the reduction in the value
of the stepwise investment strategy completely. Indeed, if the capacity of the project was ﬁxed,
then greater uncertainty would delay investment but the amount of installed capacity would remain
unaﬀected. In fact, according to Kort et al. (2010), the stepwise investment strategy dominates
under low levels of uncertainty even if it entails the installation of the same capacity size at a
greater cost than lumpy investment. By contrast, discretion over capacity allows a ﬁrm to respond
to an increase in the investment cost by optimising the endogenous relationship between the size
of the project and the time of investment.
Proposition 4.4 If a firm has discretion over capacity, then Fs(P ) > F(P ).
Moreover, from (14) we see that the existence of an optimal solution to the investment problem
under each strategy requires that the cost function is strictly convex, i.e., γj (β1 − 1) − β1 > 0 ⇔
γj >
β1
β1−1 > 1. Therefore, the convexity of the cost function is not an assumption, as indicated in
(2), but rather a property implied by the analytical framework itself. More speciﬁcally, convexity
ensures that the optimal capacity of the project is ﬁnite. Indeed, if γ >
β1
β1−1 , then 0 < kj < ∞,
whereas if γ → β1β1−1 , then kj → ∞. Consequently, the result of Proposition 4.4 is in line with
the more general intuition that a ﬁrm is typically induced to adjust its capital stock more slowly
due to diseconomies of scale associated with more rapid changes in the investment cost. Hence,
a convex investment cost implies that it is more expensive to perform adjustments, e.g., expand
capacity, at a greater than at a lower rate (Jøhansen and Kort, 1993). Additionally, note that
γ > 1 is a consequence of the exogenous price, while the result of Proposition 4.4 depends upon
the endogenous relationship between the price at investment and the capacity of the project, as
this is described in (6). Allowing for the price to depend on the amount of quantity produced via
an inverse demand function will result in a concave cost function (Dangl, 1999), yet the qualitative
relationship between the price and capacity will remain the same. Indeed, Dangl (1999) illustrates
how the optimal capacity increases monotonically with the output price under economies of scale,
i.e., γ < 1. Since the endogenous relationship between the price at investment and the capacity of
the project remains unaﬀected, Proposition 4.4 should hold under both diseconomies and economies
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of scale, and, therefore, we omit the analysis of the latter case.
Another consequence of the endogenous relationship between the output price at investment
and the size of the project, is that the amount of installed capacity under lumpy investment is
always lower than the total amount of capacity installed under a stepwise investment strategy, as
shown in Proposition 4.5. Indeed, as the investment cost associated with the stepwise investment
strategy increases, it raises both the optimal investment threshold and the amount of installed
capacity. Consequently, the ﬁrm compensates for the extra cost it incurs for the ﬂexibility to
proceed in stages by adjusting the size of the project so that it oﬀsets the reduction in the value of
the investment opportunity. As a result, the stepwise investment strategy leads to the installation
of a bigger project than that under lumpy investment. This is in contrast to Kort et al. (2010),
where a ﬁrm may delay investment due to an increase in the investment cost, yet it is restricted in
terms of the amount of capacity that it can install.
Proposition 4.5 k

<
∑n
i=1 ksi
.
In order to obtain a deeper intuition of the underlying dynamics that determine the optimal
investment policy, we analyse the impact of uncertainty on the marginal beneﬁt (MB) and the
marginal cost (MC) of delaying investment under each investment strategy assuming that the
capacity of the project is either ﬁxed or scalable. Therefore, we ﬁrst express the ﬁrm’s maximised
option value as in (15)
Fj (P ) = AjP
β1 , where Aj =
1
p
β1
j
[
pjkj
ρ− μ − I
(
kj
)]
(15)
and then describe the optimal investment rule by equating the MB of delaying investment to
the MC, as in (16). The ﬁrst term on the left–hand side of (16) is positive and represents the
incremental project value created by a marginal increase in the output price. Notice that this
term is a decreasing function of the output price, since waiting longer enables the project to start
at a higher initial price, yet the rate at which this beneﬁt accrues diminishes due to the eﬀect of
discounting. The second term is also positive and represents the reduction in the MC of waiting
to invest due to saved investment cost. Together, these two terms constitute the MB of delaying
investment. The right–hand side of (16) represents the MC of delaying investment. This term is
positive and reﬂects the opportunity cost of forgone cash ﬂows. As shown in Corollary 4.1, when
the output price is low it is worthwhile to postpone investment since the MB is greater than the
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MC.
MB = MC ⇔ β1I
(
kj
)
pj
+
kj
ρ− μ =
β1kj
ρ− μ (16)
Corollary 4.1 The MB is steeper than the MC.
As Proposition 4.6 indicates, if the capacity of the project is ﬁxed, then greater uncertainty decreases
both the MB and the MC of delaying investment, however, the impact of uncertainty on the
MC is more pronounced than that on the MB. By contrast, the opposite is true if the ﬁrm has
discretion over capacity. In fact, although in both cases greater uncertainty postpones investment,
the incentive to delay investment is greater when the ﬁrm has the ﬂexibility to scale the capacity
of the project.
Proposition 4.6 If kj is fixed, then
∂
∂σMB < 0,
∂
∂σMC < 0, and
∣∣ ∂
∂σMB
∣∣ < ∣∣ ∂∂σMC∣∣, whereas if
kj is scalable, then
∂
∂σMB > 0,
∂
∂σMC > 0, and
∂
∂σMB >
∂
∂σMC.
Notice that, if the capacity of the project, kj , is ﬁxed, then from (16) we see that both the MB
and MC of delaying investment decrease with greater uncertainty, since
∂β1
∂σ < 0. In addition, from
(A–12) we have
I(kj )
p
j
<
kj
ρ−μ , and, therefore, greater uncertainty lowers the MC by more than the
MB. As a result, the marginal value of delaying investment increases, thereby raising the incentive
to postpone investment. Intuitively, although the extra beneﬁt from allowing the project to start
at a higher output price is ﬁxed, the extra beneﬁt from saving on the investment cost and the
extra cost of the forgone cash ﬂows decrease due to the eﬀect of discounting. In fact, the latter
becomes more pronounced as both the output price and the volatility increase. By contrast, if the
capacity of the project is scalable, then the increase in the optimal capacity of the project with
greater uncertainty presents an opposing force, which mitigates the reduction in the value of β1 .
As proposition 4.6 indicates, in the latter case both MB and MC of delaying investment increase
with greater uncertainty, and, unlike the case of ﬁxed capacity, the MB increases by more than
the MC, thus increasing the incentive to delay investment. Consequently, discretion over capacity
allows the ﬁrm to manage price uncertainty more eﬃciently by adjusting the size of the project in
response to an increase in the investment cost.
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5 Numerical Examples
For the numerical examples we assume that μ = 0.01, ρ = 0.1, and σ ∈ [0, 0.4]. Also, the cost
parameters for the lumpy investment are a

= 30, b

= 0.5, and γ

= 3, while for the stepwise
investment these are as1 = 15, as2 = 25, bs1 = bs2 = 0.5, and γs1 = γs2 = 3. Under ﬁxed capacity,
the investment cost is I

= 1000, Is1 = 500, and Is2 = 900 for lumpy and stepwise investment
respectively, while the corresponding capacity levels are K

= 10, Ks1 = 3.4, and Ks2 = 6.6.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold under scalable
capacity, as well as on the optimal capacity of the project. According to the left panel, ps1
< ps2
,
and, therefore, the numerical assumptions satisfy the condition
I
(
ks1
)
I
(
ks2
) <
ks1
ks2
. Additionally, as the
right panel illustrates, with the ﬂexibility to scale the size of the project the total capacity when
proceeding in stages exceeds that of the lumpy investment, as shown in Proposition 4.5. In fact,
the wedge between ks1 +ks2 and k reﬂects the extra value that the ﬁrm has due its discretion over
capacity. Notice that, since ks1 +ks2 > k and as1 +as2 > a , the condition that stepwise investment
is more costly than lumpy investment, as indicated in (3), is also satisﬁed. Consequently, apart
from discretion over capacity, the remaining assumptions are the same as the ones underlying the
model of Kort et al. (2010).
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Figure 3: Optimal investment threshold (left) and optimal capacity (right) versus σ
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of uncertainty on the relative value of the two strategies, i.e., Fs(P )F

(P ) ,
under ﬁxed (left panel) and scalable capacity (right panel). In line with Kort et al. (2010), if
the capacity of the project is ﬁxed, then the relative value of the two strategies is greater than
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one for low levels of uncertainty, yet drops below one as uncertainty increases (left panel). Hence,
lumpy investment becomes more attractive than stepwise investment with greater uncertainty.
This happens because greater uncertainty increases inertia and raises the incentive to avoid costly
switches between stages, thereby promoting a lumpy investment strategy. By contrast, if a ﬁrm
has discretion over capacity, then the stepwise investment strategy always dominates that of lumpy
investment, as shown in Proposition 4.4. Intuitively, the ﬂexibility to scale the capacity of the
project oﬀsets the reduction in the value of the stepwise investment strategy due to the cost that a
ﬁrm must incur for the ﬂexibility to proceed in stages. Additionally, as the right panel illustrates,
the relative value of the two strategies is not only strictly greater than one, but swifts upwards as
the investment cost becomes more convex, i.e., as γj increases. This implies that a more pronounced
increase in the marginal cost of investment creates an extra incentive to adopt a stepwise investment
strategy.
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Figure 4: Relative value of the two investment strategies, i.e., lumpy and stepwise, versus σ under
ﬁxed capacity (left) and scalable capacity (right)
The left panel in Figure 5 illustrates the MB and MC of delaying investment under scalable
capacity for each stage of the project. Notice that for low price levels the MB exceeds the MC,
and, as a result, the ﬁrm has an incentive to postpone investment. Furthermore, the MB decreases
as the output price increases due to the eﬀect of discounting, while the MC is constant. The right
panel illustrates the impact of uncertainty on the total MB and MC of delaying investment in
each stage of the project under ﬁxed and scalable capacity. In the former case, the MB and MC
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decrease with greater uncertainty, while, in the latter case, the MB and MC increase, as shown in
Proposition 4.6. Intuitively, the incentive to delay investment is greater when the capacity of the
project is scalable because a modular investment enables ﬂexibility, thereby making it possible to
adapt to uncertain market conditions.
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Figure 5: MB and MC of delaying investment for stages i = 1, 2 and σ = 0.2 under scalable capacity
(left) and total MB and MC under stepwise investment (right)
6 Concluding remarks
Managerial ﬂexibility is crucial for addressing the valuation and tradeoﬀs involved in capital
projects, that are typically more complex than simple now–or–never investments. In this pa-
per, we extend the results of Kort et al. (2010) by assuming that a ﬁrm does not only have the
ﬂexibility to choose the investment strategy, in terms of lumpy versus stepwise investment, but also
has discretion over both the investment timing and the size of the project. Thus, we determine
not only the optimal investment threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity under lumpy
and stepwise investment, but also the impact of price uncertainty on the relative value of the two
investment strategies.
While Kort et al. (2010) show that the ﬂexibility to proceed in stages becomes less valuable
than lumpy investment with greater uncertainty, which is in contrast to the traditional real options
intuition that emphasises on the positive relationship between ﬂexibility and uncertainty, implica-
tions from including diﬀerent types of managerial ﬂexibilities have not been examined thoroughly
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yet. We conﬁrm the results of Kort et al. (2010), however, in addition we show that, if a ﬁrm has
discretion over capacity, then the stepwise investment strategy always dominates that of lumpy in-
vestment. This result emphasises that the relationship between ﬂexibility and uncertainty requires
further investigation. Indeed, not only is the positive relationship between the value of ﬂexibility
and uncertainty case speciﬁc, but, more importantly, the impact of uncertainty on an isolated type
of managerial discretion may be completely mitigated if the latter is combined with another type
of ﬂexibility. In this paper, we show that, although the ﬂexibility to proceed in stages becomes
less valuable than lumpy investment with greater uncertainty when a project has a ﬁxed capacity,
allowing for discretion over capacity mitigates this eﬀect completely. More speciﬁcally, the reduc-
tion in the value of the stepwise investment strategy due to the cost that a ﬁrm incurs in order to
have the ﬂexibility to proceed in stages is completely oﬀset by the extra value from the ﬂexibility
to scale the capacity of the project. Additionally, we show that the amount of installed capacity
under stepwise investment is always greater than that under lumpy investment.
The assumption that investment decisions do not aﬀect future prices can be relaxed by linking
the output price with the amount of installed capacity via an inverse demand function. Although
this in not expected to inﬂuence the main result of the paper, it would still be interesting to inves-
tigate any quantitative diﬀerence due to the implications of installing a very large project. In order
to obtain further insights on the robustness of the results regarding the relationship between uncer-
tainty and various combinations of diﬀerent types of ﬂexibilities, we may also allow for production
ﬂexibility in the context of Hagspiel et al. (2014), operational ﬂexibility in the form of options
to suspend and resume operations, or an alternative stochastic process, e.g., arithmetic Brownian
motion or mean–reverting process. Finally, in line with Siddiqui and Takashima (2012), this setup
allows for exploration of game–theoretic considerations, e.g., how the presence of a rival impacts
the decision to invest and the relative value of the two investment strategies under duopolistic
competition.
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APPENDIX
Proposition 4.1: The optimal investment threshold and the corresponding optimal capacity under
lumpy and stepwise investment are:
pj
(
kj
)
=
I
(
kj
)
kj
β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1 and kj =
[
aj
bj
1
γj (β1 − 1)− β1
] 1
γj−1
, γj (β1 − 1)− β1 > 0 (A–1)
Proof: By maximising the value of the now–or–never investment opportunity, we obtain the ex-
pression for the optimal capacity, kj , corresponding to the current output price P , as indicated in
(A–2) for j = , si .
max
Kj
F j
(
P,Kj
) ⇒ kj (P ) =
[
1
bjγj
(
P
ρ− μ − aj
)] 1
γj−1
(A–2)
Next, the value of the option to invest is described in (A–3).
Fj (P ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(1− ρdt)EP
[
Fj (P + dP )
]
, P < pj
Pkj
ρ−μ − I
(
kj
)
, P ≥ pj
(A–3)
By expanding the ﬁrst branch on the right–hand side of (A–3) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the
diﬀerential equation (A–4)
1
2
σ
2
P
2
F
′′
j
(P ) + μPF
′
j
(P )− ρFj (P ) = 0 (A–4)
which, for P < pj , has the general solution that is indicated in (A–5).
Fj (P ) = AjP
β1 +BjP
β2 (A–5)
Notice that since β2 < 0 we have P → 0 ⇒ BjP β2 → ∞. Consequently, we must have Bj = 0, and,
thus, we ﬁnally obtain (A–6).
Fj (E) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
AjP
β1 , P < pj
Pkj
ρ−μ − I
(
kj
)
, P ≥ pj
(A–6)
20
By applying value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches of (A–6) we
obtain the expression for the endogenous constant and the optimal investment threshold, that are
indicated in (A–7) and (A–8), respectively.
Aj =
1
p
β1
j
[
pjkj
ρ− μ − I
(
kj
)]
(A–7)
pj
(
kj
)
=
I
(
kj
)
kj
β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1 (A–8)
Finally, by inserting (A–8) into (A–2), we obtain the expression for the optimal capacity.
kj =
[
aj
bj
1
γj(β1 − 1)− β1
] 1
γ
j
−1
, γj (β1 − 1)− β1 > 0 (A–9)
Proposition 4.2: ps1 is independent of ps2 .
Proof: If we assume that τs2
≥ τs1 , then ps1 ≤ ps2 and the maximised option value in the case of
staged investment is indicated in (A–10).
Fs(P ) =
(
P
ps1
)β1 ⎡⎣ps1 ks1
ρ− μ − I
(
ks1
)
+
(
ps1
ps2
)β1 [
ps2 ks2
ρ− μ − I
(
ks2
)]⎤⎦ (A–10)
Hence, ps1 satisﬁes that FONC (A–11)
β1
(
− 1
ps1
)[
ps1 ks1
ρ− μ − I
(
ks1
)]
+
ks1
ρ− μ = 0 (A–11)
from which we have:
ps1 =
I
(
ks1
)
ks1
β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1 (A–12)
Consequently, ps1
is independent of ps2
, i.e., the presence of the second stage does not aﬀect the
decision to invest in the ﬁrst one. Note that the assumption ps1 < ps2 can be expressed as in
21
(A–13).
I
(
ks1
)
I
(
ks2
) < ks1
ks2
(A–13)
Proposition 4.3:
∂kj
∂σ > 0 and
∂pj
∂σ > 0.
Proof: By diﬀerentiating the expression of the optimal capacity in (A–9) we have:
∂kj
∂σ
= kj
[
− ∂∂σβ1
γj (β1 − 1)− β1
]
, γj (β1 − 1)− β1 > 0 (A–14)
Since ∂∂σβ1 < 0, we have
∂kj
∂σ > 0. Additionally, the expression of the optimal investment threshold
is:
pj
(
kj
)
=
I
(
kj
)
kj
β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1
=
ajkj + bjk
γj
j
kj
β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1
=
(
aj + bjk
γ
j
−1
j
) β1(ρ− μ)
β1 − 1 (A–15)
Since ∂∂σ
β1
β1−1 > 0 and
∂
∂σkj > 0 we have
∂
∂σpj > 0.
Proposition 4.4: If a firm has discretion over capacity, then Fs(P ) > F(P ).
Proof: The relative value of the two strategies is indicated in (A–16).
Fs(P )
F

(P )
=
∑
i
Fs
i
(P )
F

(P )
(A–16)
In order to show that Fs(P ) > F(P ), we will show that each term on the right–hand side of (A–16)
is greater than one, i.e:
Fsi
(P )
F

(P )
=
(
P
psi
)β1 [
psi
ksi
ρ−μ − I
(
ksi
)]
(
P
p

)β1 [p

k

ρ−μ − I (k)
] =
(
ksi
k

)β1
I (k

)
β1−1
I
(
ks
i
)β1−1 > 1, i = 1, 2 (A–17)
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By manipulating the expression of the relative value in (A–17) we obtain (A–18).
(
ks
i
k

)β1
I (k

)
β1−1
I
(
ks
i
)β1−1 > 1 ⇔
I(k)
β1−1
k
β1

I
(
ksi
)β1−1
k
β1
s
i
> 1 ⇔
ks
i
k

I(k)
β1−1
k
β1−1

I
(
ksi
)β1−1
k
β1−1
si
> 1 (A–18)
Without loss of generality, we assume that γ

= γsi
= γ and b

= bsi
= b. Consequently, any
diﬀerence between the investment cost of each stage i and that of lumpy investment is expressed
through aj . Notice that this maintains the convexity of the investment cost without violating
condition (3). The implication of this assumption is indicated in (A–19).
ksi
k

=
(
asi
a

) 1γ−1
(A–19)
By substituting the expression for
ksi
k

into (A–18) and by inserting the expression for the optimal
capacity from (A–9) into (A–18), we ﬁnally obtain (A–20).
ksi
k

I(k)
β1−1
k
β1−1

I
(
ksi
)β1−1
k
β1−1
si
=
(
asi
a

) 1γ−1 (
a

asi
)β1−1
=
(
a

asi
)β1− γγ−1
(A–20)
Notice that (β1 − 1) (γ − 1) > 1 ⇔ β1 > γγ−1 , which is the required condition so that kj ∈
R
+
. Additionally, by diﬀerentiating (A–17) with respect to σ as in (A–21), we can determine the
relationship between uncertainty and the relative value of the two strategies.
∂
∂σ
Fsi
(P )
F

(P )
=
∂
∂σ
(
a

asi
)β1− γγ−1
=
(
a

asi
)β1− γγ−1
ln
(
a

asi
)
∂β1
∂σ
(A–21)
Notice that if asi
< a

, then greater uncertainty decreases the relative value of the stepwise invest-
ment strategy. Consequently, if as
i
< a

∀i ∈ N, then σ ↗ ⇒ Fs(P )F

(P ) ↘. In addition, from (A–20)
we conclude that the stepwise investment strategy is always more valuable than lumpy investment.
Fs(P )
F

(P )
=
∑
i
Fs
i
(P )
F

(P )
=
∑
i
(
a

asi
)β1− γγ−1
> 0, if asi
< a

, ∀i ∈ N (A–22)
23
Proposition 4.5: k

<
∑n
i=1 ksi
.
Proof: The optimal capacity of the project under lumpy and stepwise investment is described in
(A–23).
kj =
[
aj
bj
1
γj (β1 − 1)− β1
] 1
γj−1
(A–23)
Setting γ

= γsi
= γ and b

= bsi
= b, the assumption I (k

) <
∑
i I
(
ksi
)
is equivalent to (A–24).
a

< as1 + as2 (A–24)
Thus, by setting ξ = 1b
1
γ(β1−1)−β1 , we obtain from (A–24):
a

ξ < as1 ξ + as2 ξ ⇒ k
1
γ−1

< k
1
γ−1
s1
+ k
1
γ−1
s2
(A–25)
Since (A–25) is true ∀γ : γ > β1β1−1 > 1, it is also true for γ = 2, and, thus, we ﬁnally have:
k

< ks1
+ ks2
(A–26)
Corollary 4.1: The MB is steeper than the MC.
Proof: The result follows from diﬀerentiating the MB and MC of delaying investment with respect
to the output price. Notice that the MC is positive and independent of the output price, while
∂
∂P MB < 0.
Proposition 4.6: If kj is fixed, then
∂
∂σMB < 0,
∂
∂σMC < 0, and
∣∣ ∂
∂σMB
∣∣ < ∣∣ ∂∂σMC∣∣, whereas
if kj is scalable, then
∂
∂σMB > 0,
∂
∂σMC > 0, and
∂
∂σMB >
∂
∂σMC.
Proof: The MB and MC of delaying investment is indicated in (A–27).
MB = MC ⇔ β1I
(
kj
)
pj
+
kj
ρ− μ =
β1kj
ρ− μ (A–27)
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Notice that if the capacity of the project is ﬁxed, then an increase in σ lowers both the MB and
the MC as indicated in (A–28).
∂MB
∂σ
=
I
(
kj
)
∂
∂σβ1
pj
< 0 and
∂MC
∂σ
=
kj
∂
∂σβ1
ρ− μ < 0 (A–28)
However, from (A–12) we know that
I(kj )
pj
<
kj
ρ−μ , and, therefore, the MC of delaying investment
decreases by more than the MB.
∣∣∣∣∂MC∂σ
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∂MB∂σ
∣∣∣∣ (A–29)
By contrast, if the capacity of the project is scalable, then the MB and MC of delaying invest-
ment increase with greater price uncertainty. Indeed, for P < pj we have:
∂MB
∂σ
=
I
(
kj
)
∂
∂σβ1 + β1
∂
∂σ I
(
kj
)
pj
+
∂
∂σkj
ρ− μ > 0 (A–30)
The second term on the right–hand side of (A–30) is positive since ∂∂σkj > 0. Notice also that,
even though ∂∂σβ1 < 0, β1 is bounded from below since β1 > 1. By contrast, since the capacity of
the project is not bounded and ∂∂σ I
(
kj
)
> 0, the decrease in β1 is mitigated by the increase in the
investment cost. The impact of σ on the MC is indicated in (A–31).
∂MC
∂σ
=
kj
∂
∂σβ1 + β1
∂
∂σkj
ρ− μ (A–31)
Notice that reduction in β1 makes the impact of σ on kj less pronounced, and, therefore, the second
term on the right–hand side of (A–30) is greater than right–hand side of (A–31). Since the ﬁrst
term on the right–hand side of (A–30) is positive, we have:
∂MB
∂σ
>
∂MC
∂σ
(A–32)
Finally, notice that the second term on the left–hand side of (A–27) is constant when the capacity
is ﬁxed and increasing when the capacity is scalable. Similarly, the reduction of ﬁrst term due
to the decrease in β1 with greater uncertainty is oﬀset by the increase in kj . Consequently, the
impact of σ on the MB of delaying investment is not only reversed when the ﬁrm has discretion
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over capacity but it is also more pronounced.
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